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Abstract
Many blame the recent ¯nancial market turmoil on ratings agencies. We develop an
equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine popular arguments about
the origins of and cures for ratings in°ation. In the model, asset issuers can shop for ratings
{ observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable { before auctioning their
assets. When assets are simple, agencies' ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings
shop is low. When assets are su±ciently complex, ratings di®er enough that an incentive to
shop emerges. Thus an increase in the complexity of recently-issued securities could create
a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency discloses an
unbiased estimate of the asset's true quality. Increasing competition among agencies would
only worsen this problem. Switching to a investor-initiated ratings system alleviates the
bias, but could collapse the market for information.
Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.
Soren Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855)
¤vskreta@stern.nyu.edu and lveldkam@stern.nyu.edu, 44 West Fourth st., suite 7-180, New York, NY 10012.
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participants in the Stern micro lunch for their helpful suggestions.Most market observers attribute the recent credit crunch to a con°uence of factors: lax
screening by mortgage originators, improperly estimated correlation between bundled assets,
market-distorting regulations, rating agency con°icts of interest, and a rise in the popularity of
new asset classes whose risks were di±cult to evaluate.1 This paper investigates the mis-rating
of structured credit products, widely cited as one contributor to the crisis. Our main objective is
to critically examine two arguments about why ratings problems arose and show how combining
the two could produce ratings bias that would be unanticipated by rational, but imperfectly
informed, investors.
One argument focuses on asset issuers who shop around for the highest ratings. Former
chief of Moody's, Tom McGuire, explains:2
The banks pay only if [the ratings agency] delivers the desired rating. ...If Moody's
and a client bank don't see eye-to-eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or
try its luck with a competitor like S&P, a process known as ratings shopping.
While the issuer-initiated ratings system has been around since the 1970's, ratings bias only
recently emerged as a concern. To argue that it took 30 years to detect the bias is to suggest
that learning by ¯nancial market participants is unrealistically slow. This raises the question:
Is it possible that ratings shopping previously had no or a small e®ect and that something about
the credit market changed to amplify its e®ect?
A second argument about why credit derivatives were mis-rated attributes the problem to
the increasing complexity of assets. As Mark Adelson testi¯ed to congress,3
The complexity of a typical securitization is far above that of traditional bonds.
It is above the level at which the creation of the methodology can rely solely on
mathematical manipulations. Despite the outward simplicity of credit ratings, the
1See, for instance, page 1 of the Memorandum for the President from the President's Working Group on
¯nancial markets dated March 13, 2008.
2Quote from New York Times Magazine, \Triple-A-Failure," April 27, 2008. Other articles making similar
arguments include \Why Credit-rating Agencies Blew It: Mystery Solved," available from
http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2007/10/they-mystery-of-why-credit-rating.html, \Stopping the Subprime Cri-
sis" New York Times, July 25, 2007, \When It Goes Wrong" The Economist, September 20, 2007, and \Credit
and Blame" The Economist, September 6, 2007.
3Adelson: Director of structured ¯nance research at Nomura Securities. Testimony before the Committee on
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, September 27, 2007. On January 26, 2008, The New York
Times quoted the CEO of Moody's, saying \ In hindsight, it is pretty clear that there was a failure in some key
assumptions that were supporting our analytics and our models." He said that one reason for the failure was
that the \information quality" given to Moody's, \both the completeness and veracity, was deteriorating." See
also page 10 of the Summary Report of Issues Identi¯ed in the Commission Sta®'s Examinations of Select Credit
Rating Agencies, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, July 8, 2008.
1inherent complexity of credit risk in many securitizations means that reasonable
professionals starting with the same facts can reasonably reach di®erent conclusions.
However, the credit market crisis was not generated by independent ratings errors. Only
systematic upward ratings would produce a widespread rise in the prices of credit products.
This raises the question: Is it possible that more dispersion in ratings can translate into higher
ratings on average?
We show that the combination of an increase in asset complexity and the ability of asset
issuers to shop for ratings can produce ratings in°ation, even if each ratings agency produces an
unbiased rating. We do not argue that the complexity of any given asset increased. Rather, the
composition of assets being sold changed so that the more complex type of asset, the structured
¯nancial products, particularly those that were mortgage-backed, became more prevalent. For
example, while under $10 billion in structured ¯nance collateralized debt obligations (CDO's)
were distributed in 2000, nearly $200 billion were issued in 2006 (Hu 2007).
The intuition behind our results is as follows: Each ratings agency issues an unbiased forecast
of an asset's value. However, if the announced rating is the maximum of all realized ratings,
it will be a biased signal of the asset's true quality. The more ratings di®er, the stronger are
issuers' incentives to selectively disclose (shop for) ratings. For simple assets, agencies issue
nearly identical forecasts. Asset issuers then disclose all ratings because more information
reduces investors' uncertainty and increases the price they are willing to pay for the asset. For
complex assets, ratings may di®er, creating an incentive to shop for the best rating. There is a
threshold level of asset complexity such that once this threshold is crossed, shopping becomes
optimal and ratings in°ation emerges. Furthermore, the link between asset complexity and
ratings shopping can work in both directions. An issuer who shops for ratings might want to
issue an even more complex asset, to get a broader menu of ratings to choose from. This, in
turn, makes shopping even more valuable.
Biased ratings a®ect securities prices if investors are unaware of the bias. If investors do not
know that the complexity of assets has changed, then based on past data, they would rationally
expect ratings to be unbiased, until they observed a su±cient amount of data to detect the bias.
It is always possible that there was no ratings bias and this episode is simply a bad draw.
Because of the persistence in asset returns and the short sample history of many of the new
credit derivative products, proving that their ratings were biased is a task that will become
feasible only in the far future. However, the pattern of ratings suggests a relationship between
asset complexity and over-optimistic ratings. Mason and Rosner (2007) document that com-
2plex CDOs have signi¯cantly higher default rates than simple corporate bonds with identical
ratings.4 Similarly, it was mortgage-backed securities whose underlying credit risk, correlation
risk and pre-payment risk are notoriously di±cult to assess, that experienced more widespread
downgrades than assets based on other collateral types.5
Section 1 models a market for ratings with a few salient, realistic features. In reality, the two
largest agencies, Moody's and S&P account for 80% of market share. Government regulation
essentially inhibits free entry.6 A ratings agency bases its rating primarily on publicly observable
information, but has exclusive know-how about how to translate this information into a signal
about the asset's return. When a structured credit product is issued, the issuer typically
proposes an asset structure to an agency and asks them for a \shadow rating." This rating is
private information between the agency and the issuer, unless the issuer pays the agency to
make the rating o±cial and publicize it. In the model, an asset issuer can purchase and make
public one or two signals about the payo® of an asset. We call these signals \ratings." After
choosing how many ratings to observe and which ones to make public, the issuer holds a menu
auction for his assets. After each investor submits a menu of price-quantity pairs, the asset
issuer sets the highest market-clearing price for his asset and all investors pay that price per
share.
As a benchmark, section 2 solves this model with mandatory disclosure of all observed
ratings. Section 3 solves the model with voluntary disclosure. Our main results are in section
4. If assets became more complex and harder to rate, the issuer is more likely to ratings shop,
which creates bias in disclosed ratings. Furthermore, if an asset issuer can choose to make his
asset more complex, then knowing he will shop for ratings can make more asset complexity
desirable.
Section 5 uses our model to evaluate the e®ect of recently-proposed reforms. First, we
consider whether only allowing investors-initiated ratings is viable or desirable. We modify the
model to allow any investor to observe an asset's rating at a cost. To create the potential for
ratings bias, we make a fraction of investors subject to investment-grade securities regulation,
which only allows them to purchase assets whose ratings exceed a minimum threshold. In°ated
4Alan Greenspan acknowledged the greater complexity of CDOs in his May 2005 testimony, \the credit risk
pro¯le of CDO tranches poses challenges to even the most sophisticated market participants' and cautioned
investors \not to rely solely on rating-agency assessments of credit risk."
5\Other collateral types that began to be securitized well after mortgages are far less complex. The ¯rst
non-mortgage securitization was equipment leases, followed by credit cards and auto loans, and more recently,
home equity, lease ¯nance, manufactured housing, student loans, and synthetic structures. All of those types
of collateral illustrate tranching structures that are measurably simpler than those for RMBS." (Mason and
Rosner 2007)
6See Sylla (2001) and Co®ee (2006) for overviews of the ratings industry.
3ratings expand their investment possibility set. However, investors do not shop for ratings
because they optimally use all available information in forming their bids. Thus, if the source of
bias is not ratings agencies themselves, but is instead ratings shopping, then investor-initiated
ratings are likely to be less biased. The downsides to investor-initiated ratings are that investors
can free-ride on others' information and that the ratings market can easily collapse. If investors
cannot overcome these problems, even biased ratings may be better than no information at all.
Another proposed reform is to allow more agencies to compete in providing ratings. For
the case of issuer initiated ratings, we show that having more rating agencies would exacerbate
the problem of bias because there will be more ratings to choose from. In the investor-initiated
ratings model, increasing the number of agencies is inconsequential. Finally, we consider the
logistical problems with mandatory disclosure laws.
A controversial assumption we maintain throughout is that agencies produce unbiased rat-
ings. Appendix B explores a version of our model that relaxes this assumption. We do not deny
that rating agencies may report biased ratings in an attempt to increase their business. Rather,
our point is that even if ratings agency con°icts of interest are resolved, bias could continue to
plague ratings.
Our contribution vis-a-vis existing literature As a theoretical contribution, out paper
builds on three distinct literatures. First, we add an interaction between ratings and equilibrium
asset prices to the literature on ratings agencies. Other papers that model ratings agencies are
quite district from our work. Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2007) identify circum-
stances under which the optimal renegotiation-proof contract between the rating agency and
the ¯rm results in the ¯rm owning its rating. In their setup, the rating reveals the asset value
perfectly and the price of the asset is exogenous. Farhi, Lerner and Tirole (2008) focus on other
aspects of ratings, such as their transparency and coarseness. In Damiano, Li and Suen (2008),
Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2008) and Becker and Milbourn (2008), a rating agency prefers
to in°ate its clients' ratings, but has some reputation cost of reporting a value far away from
the asset's true, exogenous price. They investigate the equilibrium level of bias. In contrast,
our model's rating agencies report the truth. We show that even if ratings agencies produce
unbiased ratings, bias in disclosed ratings can still exist.
Second, we extend the literature on information in asset markets by modeling what infor-
mation investors have access to. While most papers in this literature ask how some exogenous
information structure a®ects asset prices and portfolios, there are a few that, like ours, consider
4endogenous information.7 In each of these models, investors can acquire unbiased signals. Our
model explores how asset issuers choose to disclose signals and the resulting signal bias.
Third, we augment the existing literature on sellers who provide information about their
goods by considering how much information to provide.8 In Shavell (1994), either the seller
or a buyer can acquire information. Like our paper, Shavell studies equilibrium information
acquisition under voluntary and mandatory disclosure regimes. But because Shavell's buyers
know that sellers may be hiding information, any equilibrium without full disclosure unravels.
In Jovanovic (1982), the fact that disclosure is costly prevents unraveling. In all these papers,
there is a single signal to reveal or not. This precludes the possibility of shopping for ratings.
More broadly, our ¯ndings highlight the role that institutions, rules and market structure
play in an industry that produces information. A central question in the mechanism design
literature is what institutions are most desirable when information is asymmetric or dispersed.
This paper asks the reverse question: What information do agents choose to observe or disclose
in a given institution and market structure? As the recent crisis highlights, understanding the
information provision is as important as understanding the institutions. When information
production runs amok, large economic °uctuations can result.
1 A Model of an Asset Auction and a Market for Ratings
This is a static model of an asset issuer, who has many units of an asset to sell and a continuum of
investors who want to buy those assets. The asset's value is unknown to the market participants.
Information about the value of the asset is produced and sold by the credit rating agencies. The
total supply of the asset is ¯xed and determined by the issuer. The market-clearing price is
determined though a uniform price auction, where the sum of the bidders' bidding schedules
determines the aggregate demand.9 Investors choose their bidding functions so as to maximize
their utility subject to the information that they have. What information they have depends
on whether the rating is purchased by the issuer (in which case the issuer makes it public)
or by the investors. Below we investigate how each of these di®erent arrangements about who
7For an overview of the role of exogenous information in asset markets, see Brunnermeier (2001). For more
recent work on this topic, see Banerjee (2007). Seminal works on endogenous information include Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980). More recent work on investor-initiated information acquisition includes
Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Bullard, Evans and Honkapohja (2005) and Peress (2004).
8Seminal contributions in this literature include Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). Benabou and Laroque
(1992), Morgan and Stocken (2003) and more recently Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007) analyze the con°ict of
interest between the buyer and seller in this environment.
9This auction is similar to the limit economy in Reny and Perry (2006), but we incorporate investor risk
aversion and budget constraints.
5purchases the information a®ects the quality and the amount of information available to market
participants.
We now move on to describe a model where issuers pay for ratings. Later in the paper we
analyze a version of this model where investors pay for ratings.
Assets There are two assets: The `safe' asset o®ers riskless return r, and the risky asset pays
u, which is normally distributed u » N(¹ u;¾2
u). The price of the riskless asset is 1. The price
of risky asset is p, which is endogenous.
Investors A continuum of ex-ante identical investors has utility
U = ¡e¡½(mir+qu) (1)
where ½ is the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion and qi and mi are the number of risky and
riskless asset shares investor i ends up with. Each agent is endowed with m0
i units of riskless
asset, but can borrow and lend that asset freely at the riskless rate r. Hence each investor's
budget constraint is
mi + pqi = m0
i: (2)
The Auction The price of the risky asset is determined in an auction. Each investor submits
a bidding function that speci¯es the maximum amount that he is willing to pay for q units of
the risky asset as a function of his information. These bid functions determine the aggregate
demand. The auctioneer speci¯es a market clearing price p that equates aggregate demand and
supply and each trader pays this price for each unit purchased (uniform price auction).
We now state the bid function and verify that it constitutes an equilibrium. Bids depend
on each investor's information set Ii, which includes information inferred from b being the price
paid per unit.
b(qjIi) =
E(ujIi) ¡ q½V (ujIi)
r
; (3)
where E(ujIi) and V (ujIi) are the mean and variance of the risky asset's return, conditional on
the investor's information. The price paid per unit is exogenous from each investor's perspective
because he is in¯nitesimal compared to the rest of the market, implying that the price he faces
is determined by other investor's bid functions, together with the aggregate supply. Therefore,
a realized price b reveals information about others' bids, which in turn is partially informative
about what they know.
6Each bidder is in¯nitesimal, which implies that he takes the market clearing price as given.
Thus, the bidding function (3) is the inverse demand function of a trader who seeks to maximize
(1) subject to (2), taking p as given. It can be easily veri¯ed that the objective of this constrained





V [ujIi]¡1(E[ujIi] ¡ pr): (4)
Because the above bidding function is an inverse demand function of (4), it is a best response
given everyone else's bid function.
When issuers solicit a rating, they either disclose the rating to all investors or keep it private
so that no investor observes it. Either way, investors have symmetric information I. Integrating





(E[ujI] ¡ ½V ar[ujI]x): (5)
Ratings Agencies Credit ratings agencies produce ratings, which are noisy unbiased signals
about the risky asset payo® u. We consider two rating agencies, because this is the simplest
setting in which to illustrate our results.
We assume that a shadow rating µ is an unbiased signal about the payo® µ » N(u;¾2
µ);
produced at marginal cost ~ Â. The issuer can choose to keep the rating private or to make it
public information.10 All rating agencies produce the same service. Since there is no quantity
choice, ¯rms compete in a Bertrand way and set price equal to marginal cost: ~ Â for shadow
ratings and Â + ~ Â for publicly-issued ratings.
De¯nition 1 A more complex asset is one with more noise in its ratings: It has a higher ¾2
µ.
Asset Issuer The issuer is endowed with x shares of the risky asset and his objective is to
maximize expected pro¯t. We ¯rst consider the case where the issuer initiates the rating. In
this model, the issuer's expected pro¯t is the price times quantity of the asset sold, minus the
cost of observed and disclosed ratings:
¦ = px ¡ ~ s~ Â ¡ sÂ; (6)
10When a separation occurs, ratings agencies are not withholding the rating because the exact structured
product they rated is rarely issued. Rather, the rating and asset structure are negotiated. Another agency may
tell the issuer that structuring the security with slightly more low-risk assets will earn it the sought after rating.
Then, this slightly modi¯ed security would be issued. See Mason and Rosner (2007) for a detailed description of
this process.
7where ~ s is the number of shadow ratings observed, including the ones eventually disclosed, and
s is the number of publicly disclosed ratings.
Model Timing Stage 1: Ratings Acquisition and Disclosure. The issuer decides whether to
obtain a rating or not. If he decides to do so, he visits one of the two ratings agencies. Upon
obtaining a shadow rating he decides whether to obtain another shadow rating or not. If he
does not, he decides whether to publish the obtained rating or not. If he decides to move on to
obtain a shadow rating from the other agency, then he decides whether to disclose no, one, or
both ratings.
Stage 2: Price Determination. An auction determines the market clearing price.
With voluntary disclosure, the asset issuer's decisions are summarized in Figure 1. After












to disclose 0,1 
or 2 ratings
Decide whether 
to disclose 0 or 
1 ratings
Figure 1: An asset issuer's decision tree.
2 The Benchmark: Mandatory Disclosure of Shadow Ratings
When asset issuers must choose how many ratings to acquire before observing the ratings and
must disclose every rating observed, there is no opportunity for selection e®ects to bias the
disclosed ratings. In order to investigate the ratings bias that ratings shopping generates,
we ¯rst solve a mandatory disclosure model without any ratings bias as a benchmark. With
mandatory disclosure, the only thing that the issuer decides is whether to obtain zero, one or
two ratings. He must make that choice before observing the ratings.




(¹ u ¡ ½¾2
ux): (7)





µ ) and the conditional variance of the asset will be V [ujµ] =
1=(¾¡2
u + ¾¡2
µ ). Since the issuer decides to acquire the rating before he knows its outcome, he















Thus, the di®erence in issuer utility from buying information is
¹ ¦M









¡ Â ¡ ~ Â; (9)
where ¹ ¦M
s=0 (¹ ¦M
s=1) stands for the issuer's expected pro¯ts from obtaining no (respectively one)
rating under mandatory disclosure. The issuer chooses to purchase a rating if (9) is non-negative.












The issuer chooses to obtain two shadow ratings instead of one if
¹ ¦M










¡ Â ¡ ~ Â > 0: (11)
Note, that if (9) is positive, (11) will be too. Hence if the issuer pro¯ts from acquiring one
shadow rating, he also pro¯ts from a second rating.
Comparative Statics with Mandatory Disclosure The incentive to acquire an extra
shadow rating is increasing in the coe±cient of risk aversion because information reduces the
risk the investors face when they buy the asset. The more averse they are to this risk, the more
information increases their value for the asset. The value of a rating is also increasing in the
quantity of the asset o®ered because information has returns to scale. It is likewise decreasing in
the risk-free rate, because when the excess return on the risky asset is lower, information about
11Some ¯xed-income securities are issued without ratings. Such unrated bonds are classi¯ed as junk bonds.
Typically these are small net worth assets.
9that asset is less valuable. Finally, the value of a rating is non-monotonic in asset complexity
(¾µ). The value of the ¯rst rating is always decreasing in complexity because a more complex
asset is harder to rate and the resulting rating is less precise and thus less valuable ((9) is
decreasing in ¾2
µ). The value of the second rating could also be lower for the same reason, or
it could be higher because having less information from the ¯rst rating increases the marginal
value of additional information: (9) is increasing in asset complexity if the variance of the asset's
returns is high, relative to the complexity of the asset (2¾4
u > ¾2
µ) and is decreasing otherwise.12
Ultimately, a model with complete disclosure of ratings by asset issuers and truthful report-
ing by ratings agencies cannot explain bias in ratings. We introduced it because it illustrates
the mechanics of the solution. We now explore the more realistic voluntary disclosure case to
understand where ratings bias might come from.
3 Solving the Voluntary Disclosure Model
The key trade-o® an asset issuer faces is the following: Withholding the most negative ratings
makes the asset appear more valuable to investors, while publicizing more ratings makes the
asset less risky. In other words, disclosure lowers the conditional variance of the risky asset payo®
u while ratings shopping increases its conditional mean. Both e®ects increase the price investors
are willing to pay and thus increase the issuer's pro¯t. We investigate which circumstances favor
ratings shopping, as well as the resulting bias in the asset price.
For this discussion to be meaningful, we need to ensure that ratings bias is not irrelevant. In
particular, sophisticated investors should not be able to infer the expected bias, subtract that
expected bias from the announced rating, and neutralize its e®ects through their actions.
Assumption 1 Investors do not correct for ratings selection bias: For every announced rating,
they believe µ » N(u;¾2
µ). For unrated assets, they believe that u » N(¹ u;¾2
u).
This assumption implies that investors are not able to make correct inferences from the
rating agencies actions (the number of ratings they chose to disclose). The feature that players
are unable to form the correct mapping about the informativeness of other people's actions is an
important feature of the equilibrium notion of Eyster and Rabin (2005), and of Esponda (2008)






























10The assumption that investors believed ratings to be unbiased is consistent with our main
argument that much of the bias was a recent phenomenon. Suppose investors did not observe
asset complexity in a dynamic model, but knew that regime changes in complexity were possible.
They would infer asset complexity and thus ratings bias from the past history of ratings and asset
outcomes. Since the historical data came from mostly simple assets, investors would initially
believe that assets are simple, that no ratings shopping is taking place, and that ratings are
unbiased. Even after assets became more complex, this belief would persist until they observed a
su±ciently long series of ratings and payo®s from the complex assets. Thus, with an unexpected
change in asset characteristics, even rational investors would not have initially detected ratings
bias.13
3.1 The disclosure decision
To solve the model, we start with the last decision and work backwards. We begin by considering
an issuer who has already chosen how many ratings to acquire and is deciding how many to
disclose. If the asset issuer chooses not to solicit any ratings, then the asset price is the same
whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory because there is no rating to disclose. But when
the asset issuer solicits one or two shadow ratings, he faces the following choices.
Disclosure with two shadow ratings We ¯rst investigate the disclosure decision of an
issuer who has acquired two shadow ratings. We call the higher rating ¹ µ, and the lower µ; so
that ¹ µ > µ. We want to identify under which conditions the issuer will disclose none, one or both
ratings. Since the asset issuer is always more inclined to announce a higher rating, disclosing
one rating means disclosing ¹ µ.
We ¯rst compare the alternatives of disclosing one versus no ratings. If the issuer announces
no ratings, the conditional mean and variance of the asset payo® are the unconditional mean
and variance, ¹ u and ¾2
u. Therefore, the price of the asset is the same as in (7).
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Let ¦D=d stand for the issuer's pro¯t from disclosing d ratings. Then the additional utility
13If investors are sophisticated and can perfectly account for how the issuers disclosure rule varies with asset
complexity, we anticipate that unraveling would occur similar to that in Shavell (1994), where all undisclosed
information is treated as if it is bad news. Thus, all ratings would be disclosed.
11gained from disclosing information is
¦D=1(¹ µ) ¡ ¦D=0 =
£











Having purchased at least one shadow rating, the asset issuer discloses that rating if (13) is






Â + ¹ u ¡ ½x¾2
u: (14)
Since (13) is monotonically increasing in ¹ µ, the asset issuer discloses at least one rating if ¹ µ ¸ a.
In summary, when disclosure of ratings is voluntary, the issuer discloses one versus no ratings
when the rating obtained is high enough.
Consider next the choice between disclosing one or two ratings. If the issuer discloses both
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The issuer prefers to disclose both ratings if
¦D=2(¹ µ;µ) ¡ ¦D=1(¹ µ) =
£
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¢ ¡ Â > 0: (16)
Since (16) is monotonically increasing in µ, the issuer discloses both ratings if µ ¸ b(¹ µ), where
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In other words, the issuer prefers to shop, that is disclose only the highest of the two ratings,
when µ is much lower than ¹ µ, (µ < b(¹ µ)).
Finally, the issuer will disclose no ratings if no ratings are preferable to one rating and to
two ratings. Both these conditions are satis¯ed if ¹ µ < a.14
14Zero ratings are preferred to two ratings when ¦D=0 ¡ ¦D=2(¹ µ;µ) > 0; which happens if ·
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(this is because by de¯nition µ · ¹ µ): Substituting this sum in the above inequality,
one can see that it is always satis¯ed. The details can be found in Technical Appendix: Computation Details for
12In summary, the disclosure decision for an issuer that has acquired two shadow ratings is
Disclose both ratings if ¹ µ ¸ a and µ ¸ b(¹ µ):
Disclose highest rating if ¹ µ ¸ a and µ < b(¹ µ):
Disclose no ratings if ¹ µ < a:
Disclosure with one shadow rating Suppose the asset issuer has acquired only 1 shadow
rating. With a slight abuse of notation, we call that rating ¹ µ. The issuer prefers to disclose if
(13) is positive (when ¹ µ ¸ a) and does not disclose otherwise.
3.2 The acquisition decision
Now that we understand the issuer's disclosure decisions, we move back one node in the decision
tree to study ratings acquisition. The issuer makes two decisions sequentially. First he decides
whether to acquire the ¯rst shadow rating and then he decides whether to acquire the second
one. Again we work backwards: We start with the decision of the issuer who already has one
shadow rating and considers whether to obtain a second. We call µ1 the ¯rst shadow rating
observed and µ2 the second.
The decision to acquire the second rating The decision depends on whether the ¯rst
rating is high enough to disclose (µ1 ¸ a).
Case 1: The ¯rst rating was high (µ1 > a). If the second draw is low relative to the ¯rst draw
(µ2 < b(µ1)), then the issuer discloses only the ¯rst rating µ1. If the second draw is su±ciently
high to disclose and not so high that it makes the ¯rst rating no longer worthwhile to disclose
(b(µ1) < µ2 < µ¤), the issuer discloses both ratings. If the second rating is much higher than the
¯rst rating, the issuer discloses only the second rating. Thus, the expected price (E(p2jµ1 > a))
contains three terms corresponding to these three possibilities:







where p1(µ1) and p2(µ1;µ2) are de¯ned in (12) and (15), and where µ¤ is the value of µ2 such
that µ1 = b(µ2); implying that µ¤ = b¡1(µ1):
the Disclosure Decision 2 versus 0. This observation allows us to conclude that the issuer will disclose no ratings
when ¹ µ < a.
13If µ1 > a and the issuer sticks with one rating, his pro¯t is
¦(1)(µ1) = p1(µ1)x ¡ Â ¡ ~ Â:
If he obtains a second rating, his expected pro¯t conditional on µ1 is
¦(2)(µ1jµ1 > a) = ¹ p(2)(µ1jµ1 > a)x ¡ 2(~ Â + Â); (19)
where ¹ p(2)(µ1jµ1 > a) is given by (18). The expected bene¯t from acquiring the second rating
depends on the di®erence in the asset price between disclosing two versus one ratings and on
the di®erence in the price between disclosing µ2 alone and disclosing µ1 alone. Each di®erence
is weighted by the probability that µ2 takes on a value that makes the associated disclosure
optimal.
¦(2)(µ1jµ1 > a) ¡ ¦(1)(µ1) =
Z µc¡1(µ1)
b(µ1)
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f(µ2)dµ2 ¡ ~ Â: (20)
where the second line uses (12) and (15) to substitute out p1 and p2.
Case 2: The ¯rst rating was low (µ1 < a). If the second rating is also low (µ2 < a), then
the issuer will disclose no ratings. If the second rating is moderately high, it is possible that
the issuer discloses both ratings, even though the ¯rst was too low to disclose on its own. If the
second rating is high (µ2 > b¡1(µ1)), the issuer discloses only the second rating. The expected
price (E(p2jµ1 < a)) contains three terms that correspond to these three possibilities







where p0 is given by (7).
If µ1 < a and the issuer does not obtain a second rating, then he discloses no rating and
earns pro¯t ¦(1)(µ1) = p0x. If he obtains a second rating, his expected pro¯t conditional on µ1
14is ¦(2)(µ1jµ1 < a) = ¹ p(2)(µ1jµ1 < a)x ¡ 2(~ Â + Â). Thus, the expected bene¯t from acquiring the
second rating is




[(p2(µ1;µ2) ¡ p0)x ¡ 2Â]f(µ2)dµ2 +
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Let £2 denote the region of realizations of the ¯rst rating where the di®erences in (20) and in
(22) are positive. For this region, the issuer will choose to obtain a second draw.
The decision to acquire the ¯rst rating When the issuer makes this decision he has
only his prior information. He compares the expected pro¯t from acquiring no rating, ¦(0) =
x
r(¹ u ¡ ½¾2
ux), with the expected pro¯t from acquiring the ¯rst rating, ¦(1). This pro¯t is
calculated anticipating four possible future acquisition and disclosure decisions: the ¯rst rating
may be too low to disclose but may prompt the investor to acquire a second rating; the ¯rst
rating may be high enough to disclose and still prompt the acquisition of a second rating; the
¯rst rating may be too low to disclose and may still deter the acquisition of a second rating;





¦(2)(µ1jµ1 < a)dF(µ1) +
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(p1(µ1)x ¡ Â ¡ ~ Â)dF(µ1) (23)
where p0 is given by (7), p1 is given by (12), and the formula for expected pro¯ts with two
ratings ¦(2)(¢) is in (19).
4 Main Results: Asset Complexity and Ratings Bias
So far we have analyzed the issuer's incentives to acquire shadow ratings under two regimes: the
mandatory and the voluntary disclosure regime. For each of these regimes we identi¯ed cases
where the issuer prefers to obtain none, one, or two shadow ratings. In each case, choices depend
on the characteristics of the asset to be rated. One of those characteristics is how reliably an
15asset can be rated, an attribute we call asset complexity.
This section considers the interaction between greater asset complexity and the ratings
shopping which creates ratings bias. There are two pieces to this interaction. First, we consider
how an exogenous change in asset complexity a®ects the incentive to shop for ratings. Second,
we show that ratings shopping can create an incentive to structure more complex securities.
4.1 How complexity a®ects the incentive to shop for ratings
Our argument is that ratings shopping arose as the nature of credit products and their market
changed. For this to be a plausible explanation, we need to show that the bene¯t of ratings
shopping in (16) is increasing in some parameter that was trending up at the time. This leads
us to ask the following comparative statics question: Given two shadow ratings, what happens
to the incentive to publicly disclose these ratings as an asset becomes more complex?
The e®ect of complexity turns out to be non-monotonic. For either very low or high asset
complexity (¾2
µ ! 0 or ¾2
µ ! 1), ratings shopping always takes place. When ¾2
µ ! 1 in (16),
¦D=1(¹ µ) ¡ ¦D=2(¹ µ;µ) clearly converges to Â. When ¾2
µ ! 0 the same results follows from the
fact that ¹ µ ¡µ tends to zero. Since Â is positive, disclosing one rating is preferred to disclosing
both. The intuition is that when asset complexity is small, ratings are precise. The extent to
which publicizing a second rating reduces the risk of investing in the asset is too small to be
worth the cost. When asset complexity is high, ratings become uninformative. Since investors
know this, issuing multiple ratings has little price impact and is again, not worth the cost.
Numerical example We consider an asset issuer who has observed two shadow ratings and
is deciding how many of these to disclose. The net bene¯t of disclosing a second rating is given
by (16). Since this depends on the realized ratings, we ¯rst take an expectation over these
realizations. For a normal variable with mean ¹ u and variance ¾2
µ, the expected highest and
lowest order statistics out of a sample of two are
¾µ
¼ + ¹ u and ¡
¾µ
¼ + ¹ u (Kotz, Balakrishnan and
Johnson 2000).15
Figure 2 shows a case where the expected pro¯t of disclosing the second rating is lower,
higher and then lower again compared to the expected pro¯t from disclosing one rating. The
vertical lines represent the two roots { levels of ¾µ that make the issuer indi®erent between
15The expectation of ¹ µ; is the expectation of the highest order statistic out of a sample of two. From Kotz
et. al. we know that this expectation for a standard normal distribution is given by
1
¼: Since here ratings are
distributed by N(¹ u;¾
2
µ); this expectation is given by
¾µ
¼ + ¹ u: This follows from the fact that the expectation is
linear in the mean and standard deviation.
16disclosing 1 or 2 ratings. Ratings bias would arise in the ¯rst or third regions where the issuer
chooses only to disclose the higher of the two observed ratings.
Not every set of parameters will generate this pattern. If both roots are not positive real
numbers, then disclosing one or no ratings could be optimal. But in that case, it would never
be optimal to disclose two ratings, for any level of asset complexity.





































Figure 2: The average asset issuer's expected value of disclosing zero, one or two ratings, for
various levels of asset complexity (¾2
µ). Parameter values: x = 2:5, r = 1:03, ¾
2
u = :5, ¹ u = 10, Â = 0:3 and
½ = 1.
This example was constructed for the average signal realizations, in order to keep it simple.
As asset complexity increases, there will be a distribution of signal outcomes. Some will prompt
asset issuers to disclose them as ratings, others not. Thus, for a given set of parameter values
we can calculate the probability of ratings shopping. Then, instead of a discrete change from no
bias to bias, there is a continuous change from a low to a high probability of ratings shopping.
The next set of results take into account the random nature of the realized ratings.
4.2 How complexity a®ects the demand for shadow ratings
Just like complexity had a non-monotonic e®ect on disclosure, it also has a non-monotonic e®ect
on ratings acquisition. The reason that complexity's e®ect is non-monotonic can be seen by
considering its limiting cases again. When complexity approaches zero, each rating is perfectly
precise. Therefore, there is no bene¯t and only a cost to acquiring a second rating. When
complexity approaches in¯nity, ratings are uninformative. Again, there is no bene¯t and only a
cost to acquiring either a ¯rst or second rating. In between these two extremes, we know that
there can be a value to acquiring more than one rating in order to shop for the best one. But
if that is the case, then rising complexity must cause the net bene¯t of a second rating to rise
and then fall.
17A key e®ect of changing complexity is that it changes the distribution of ¹ µ and µ. To
incorporate this e®ect, we do a change of variables and express the expected bene¯t of acquiring
a second rating ((20) and (22)) in terms of standard normal random variables. The partial
derivative with respect to ¾2
µ reveals that the e®ect of complexity on ratings acquisition is
non-monotonic.16


































acquire 1 shadow rating
acquire 2 shadow ratings
Figure 3: The asset issuer's expected value of obtaining zero, one or two shadow ratings for
various levels of asset complexity (¾2
µ). Parameter values are identical to those in ¯gure 1, except that we
take expectations over µ1 and µ2, instead of ¯xing their values. In addition, ~ Â = 0:1.
To see what e®ects arise for non-extreme parameter values, we return to our numerical
example. Using the same parameters as in ¯gure 2, ¯gure 3 plots the asset issuer's expected
pro¯t from obtaining 0, 1 or 2 shadow ratings. As asset complexity rises, the number of shadow
ratings acquired starts at one, rises to two, falls back to one, and eventually becomes zero.
4.3 How complexity a®ects ratings bias
The average percentage bias in ratings appears in Figure 4. The concurrent increase in asset
complexity and ratings bias is the amalgamation of many di®erent e®ects. First, it incorporates
the disclosure decision in ¯gure 3. As complexity rises, a ¯rm with two average ratings discloses
one then two then one rating again. But ¯gure 3 obscures the fact that the issuer will not always
draw average ratings. Therefore, there will always be some probability of ratings shopping
whenever ratings are acquired. The second e®ect is that as complexity rises, two ratings become
farther apart, on average. Thus the ratings bias generated by ratings shopping grows. The third
e®ect is the change in ratings acquisition. As complexity grows from a low level, more issuers
get a second rating, enabling them to choose the highest one to disclose.
When complexity becomes very large, bias plummets. This corresponds to the level of
16Details available upon request.


































Figure 4: The percentage bias in ratings for various levels of asset complexity (¾2
µ). Parameter
values are identical to those in ¯gure 2. Ratings bias is the average of all disclosed ratings, minus the true mean
of the distribution from which the ratings are drawn. It is expressed as a percentage deviation from the true
mean.
complexity where issuers no longer want to acquire any shadow rating because ratings contain
too little information to be worth their cost. One might wonder why bias does not drop at
¾µ = 1:4, where the the value of acquiring no ratings surpasses the value of one rating in ¯gure
3. This is because the solid line is the value of acquiring one and only one rating. But choosing
to acquire a ¯rst rating also gives the issuer the option value to acquire a second rating. This
total value of acquiring a ¯rst shadow rating is surpassed by the value of observing no ratings
at ¾µ = 2. When no ratings are observed, ratings bias disappears.
4.4 When do asset issuers prefer more complex assets?
Consider an asset issuer who can choose whether to structure his asset as a simple security or a
complex security. Both the simple and the complex security have the same payo® distribution,
but the variance of the ratings ¾2
µ is higher for the more complex asset. The issuer chooses his
asset's complexity before it observing its shadow ratings.
Mandatory disclosure The price of the asset with no, one or two ratings is given by (7), (8)
or (10). All three prices are either constant or decreasing in the complexity of the asset. Hence
given the opportunity to design the asset, the issuer who is required to reveal every shadow
rating he obtains prefers a less complex asset.
Voluntary disclosure The drawback that more complex assets are riskier to investors and
are therefore less pro¯table for asset issuers is still present with voluntary disclosure. But that
drawback may now be o®set by the following bene¯t. If ratings are drawn from a higher-
19variance distribution, their maximum will be higher, on average; that makes ratings shopping
more pro¯table. Complex assets o®er a broader menu of ratings for the issuer to pick from.
When this advantage is large, the asset issuer will prefer to make his asset more complex.
Whether higher asset complexity is desirable depends on parameter values. Figure 3 illus-
trates a case where for small levels of asset complexity, pro¯ts rise with added complexity. In
this region with average ratings realizations, the issuer obtains only one shadow rating. But
an issuer with a lower than average ¯rst rating acquires a second rating; if the two ratings
are su±ciently far apart, he discloses the larger of the two. The fact that pro¯t increases in
¾µ indicates a motive to design more complex assets, which exacerbates the bias in disclosed
ratings.
5 Evaluating Policy Recommendations
This section uses the model framework to explore the pros and cons of three proposed reforms:
switching to investor-initiated ratings, increasing competition in the market for ratings, and
reforming risk-management regulation.
5.1 Investor-initiated ratings
One possible solution to the problem of ratings bias is to replace the system of issuer-initiated
ratings with investor-initiated ratings. We show that even though some investors, those subject
to the investment-grade securities regulations, would prefer biased ratings, they cannot shop
for ratings. However, a investor-initiated market for ratings may provide too little or even no
information.
5.1.1 A model of investor information acquisition
In this scenario, investors choose whether or not to buy a single rating. In order to ensure that
prices are not perfectly revealing, we will modify the assumption that the supply is known and




of the asset. It is partly random: x » N(0;¾x). This randomness keeps investors from being
able to free-ride on the information other investors know.
We also change the speci¯cation of prior beliefs slightly to make the expressions simpler:
The asset payo® u is the sum of its rating µ, and the noise in the rating ²: u = µ + ². Prior
20beliefs are that µ » N(u;¾2
µ) and ² » N(0;¾2
²), where µ and ² are independent. Thus we can





Let ¸ denote the fraction of investors that decide to buy a rating. A rating costs Â: Since
investors are ex-ante identical, either all investors buy information (¸ = 1), all investors do not
buy information (¸ = 0) or all are indi®erent. We use the indi®erence condition to solve for
equilibria where ¸ 2 (0;1). To do this, we need to calculate the expected utility of the informed
and the uninformed investors. The ¯rst step is to derive their risky asset demands.
Since investors have the same utility function as in the previous section, their equilibrium
asset demands satisfy the same ¯rst order condition (equation 4). However, the information
structure has changed. An informed investor, one who has observed the asset's rating µ has
posterior beliefs that the asset payo® is distributed u » N(µ;¾2
²). Substituting this posterior





² (µ ¡ pr): (24)
For uninformed investors, the asset demand qU is more complicated. Uninformed investors learn
something about µ from observing the asset price p. At the same time, the price depends on
investors' demand. This is a ¯xed point problem. We need to solve for p and qU jointly.
The price of the risky asset is determined by the market clearing condition
¸qI + (1 ¡ ¸)qU = x + ¹ x: (25)
Lemma 2 The price of the risky asset is a linear function of the rating and the random com-
ponent of the asset supply: p = A + Bµ + Cx:
Uninformed investors combine their prior belief that µ » N(¹ u;¾2
µ) and their signal from the
















and the posterior mean is

























Given informed and the uninformed investors' risky asset demand, we can calculate expected
utilities. The argument of the utility function is risk aversion times wealth: ½q(u¡pr) = (E[u]¡
pr)0V [u]¡1(u ¡ pr). This is a product of correlated normal variables. To take expected utility,
we need to know the expectation of its exponential. Appendix A.2 derives this expectation.
Lemma 3 The ratio of informed investors' expected utility to uninformed investors' expected












This ratio is less than one because utility is negative. Informed investors' utility is higher
when it is less negative and therefore smaller in absolute value.
In equilibrium, either there must be a corner solution ¸ = f0;1g or the expected net bene¯t
of information (E[UI] ¡ E[UU]) must equal the expected utility cost ¡e½ÂE[UI]. Thus, the
condition for an interior equilibrium is (¾2
² + ¾2
µjp)1=2=¾² = e½Â.
5.1.2 Can investors acquire biased ratings?
Suppose that some subset of investors can only buy assets that are \investment grade." That
means the asset's rating surpasses a threshold (µ > µINV ). This group of investors then achieves
higher expected utility if they obtain an upward-biased rating: Let © be the cumulative proba-
bility density function for the unbiased rating µ. Suppose that instead of µ, the ratings agency,
with the knowledge of the investor, issues a rating µ+². Then with probability ©(µINV ¡²), the
investor gets a rating that is too low, cannot invest, and gets no income from the risky security.
With probability 1 ¡ ©(µINV ¡ ²), the investor can invest and chooses the optimal portfolio in















Since the bias ² enters only in the bounds of integration and expands them, and since this is
a negative number times an integrand which is strictly positive, ratings bias unambiguously
22increases expected utility.
Investor-initiated ratings bias has limited price impact If the investors shop for ratings,
it is in order to ¯nd a ratings agency that gives the asset an investment-grade rating. But once
the investor ¯nds that the asset is in his feasible investment set, he should use all available
information to determine the optimal bidding strategy for the asset. Since investors use all
available information in forming their asset demands, the only price e®ect of ratings bias is to
raise the price of some assets that are not truly investment grade to the level they would be at
in the absence of regulation.
5.1.3 Downsides to investor-initiated ratings
Investor-initiated ratings can create two other problems due to information market externalities:
information leakage and market collapse due to demand complementarity. Since information
requires a ¯xed cost to discover and is free (or at least quite cheap) to replicate, e±ciency
dictates that a discovered piece of information should be distributed to every asset investor
so that all investors bene¯t from lower asset payo® risk. Yet, when investors have to pay for
ratings themselves, either no investors or too few investors may end up being informed.
Information leakage One reason why asset investors may decide not to buy information
is that they can partially free-ride on the information others observe. The price of the asset
will depend on what informed investors know. While the uninformed investors cannot literally
observe the price before they bid, they can condition on the price when they submit their menu
of bids. When deciding on the quantity they will associate with each realized price, the investor
asks himself, \If that is the realized price, what would it tell me about what the informed
investors have learned?" In this way, uninformed investors can use information contained in
prices to free ride on what others have learned.
An increase in the number of informed investors ¸ reduces the posterior uncertainty of
uninformed investors, conditional on the price level ¾ujp. Recall that the noise in the asset price
about the rating µ is (C=B)2¾x. Having more informed investors (higher ¸) reduces (C=B)2
(equations (31) and (32) in appendix). This makes prices more informative (reduces ¾ujp in
equation (26)) and reduces the bene¯t of acquiring information (lemma 3). This is a form of
strategic substitutability that makes it unlikely that asset investors will ever all choose to be
informed.
23Complementarity in information demand and market collapse Endogenizing the price
of ratings so that what each investor pays Â(¸) depends on how many purchase the information
introduces a complementarity that can collapse the market for information. Market collapse is
when no investor buys a rating because no other investors are buying them. Such a collapse can
arise in situations where the asset issuer would be willing to provide information to all investors.
Instead of assuming that ratings are provided at a ¯xed cost, we consider a pro¯t-maximizing
information-production sector. The sector has three crucial features: First, information can be
produced with a ¯xed-cost technology. A rating µ can be discovered by any agent for a ¯xed
cost c, which is the cost to the ratings agency of collecting information to construct the rating
(measured per capita). Once the rating is determined, it is costless to replicate it and sell
it to multiple investors. Each investor pays the ratings agency a price Â to observe their
rating. Second, reselling purchased information is forbidden. The realistic counterpart to this
assumption is intellectual property law that prohibits copying a publication and re-distributing
it for pro¯t. Third, there is free entry. Any agent can discover information at any time, even
after other information producers have announced their prices Â. That information markets are
competitive is crucial. The exact market structure is not.17
Lemma 4 The equilibrium price for information Â(¸) is decreasing in the quantity of informa-
tion sold ¸. Speci¯cally, Â(¸) = c=¸.
With an exogenous cost c, there is a unique equilibrium. But with the endogenous price for








e½c, then ¸ = 0 is an equilibrium. An investor who wants to acquire information must pay
the entire ¯xed cost c for that information. This cost (in utility terms) exceeds the bene¯t of








= e½c=¸. The lower of the two solutions will be an unstable
equilibrium, but the higher one will be stable. As ¸ increases, the cost of information drops,
precipitously. At the same time, the information content of the asset's price ¾¡2
ujp rises gradually,
which reduces the bene¯t of information.
The problem arises when the equilibrium is the no-information (¸ = 0) one. No investors
buy information because no other investors are buying information and if a given investor
buys information by himself, he would have to bear the entire ¯xed cost c of discovering that
17Veldkamp (2006) analyzes Cournot and monopolistic competition markets for information. All three markets
produce information prices that decrease in demand.
24information. In such a situation, the biased information provided by the asset-issuer-initiated
ratings could result in more accurate asset prices than no information at all.
5.2 Increasing competition among ratings agencies
Because market failures are often associated with a lack of free competition, many have suggested
that regulatory barriers inhibiting entry of new ratings agencies be abolished. While this might
cure some problems with ratings provision, it does not remedy ratings shopping. In fact, it
would worsen the problem.
When the issuer shops for ratings, the more draws the issuer can observe before choosing a
rating, i.e. the larger the number of rating agencies, the higher this bias will be.
Proposition 5 If the asset issuer will disclose only the most favorable rating, then increasing
the number of ratings agencies will (weakly) increase the bias of the disclosed rating.
This result follows from the simple observation that the more rating agencies are available,
the greater the possibilities of ratings shopping. Of course, having more ratings agencies does
not ensure that an asset issuer will observe more shadow ratings. If not, then the bias will
stay constant. However, if some issuers prefer to obtain more shadow ratings than what was
previously available to them, increasing the number of agencies will increase the number of
observed ratings and the bias from shopping for the best one. It is also possible that the price
of shadow ratings falls due to higher competition, encouraging asset issuers to sample more
ratings would increase ratings bias even more.
5.3 The e®ect of risk-management legislation
Another target for criticism in the ratings scandal has been the role that risk-management rules
played. Many banks and pension funds are required to hold only investment-grade securities.
These are assets who earn su±ciently high ratings from one of the nationally-recognized sta-
tistical ratings organizations (NRSRO's) (this group includes Moody's, S&P and Fitch). This
rule puts an enormous amount of pressure on asset issuers to ensure their assets achieve this
rating. Without it, the pool of potential investors is considerably smaller and the asset's prices
will be considerably lower.
Repealing the investment-grade securities regulations alone will not solve the problem of rat-
ings shopping. With investor-initiated ratings, the bias arose without the regulation. However,
25it is likely that this regulation further encouraged ratings shopping by increasing the payo® for
acquiring a high rating, for a given level of ratings uncertainty.
5.4 Mandatory disclosure laws
Perhaps an obvious suggestion is to mandate disclosure of all ratings. While that is a cure
in theory, in practice, it is di±cult to regulate the transmission of information directly. For
example, the line between informal advice and a rating can be easily blurred. Prohibiting
a discussion of how various assets might be rated if they were issued could easily be ruled
an infringement on free speech. An additional problem is that when undesirable ratings are
proposed, the asset in question is frequently restructured. A tiny change in asset structure
would make the previous rating no longer applicable and could e®ectively hide that rating.
6 Conclusions
Examining commonly-forwarded arguments about how ratings may have distorted credit deriva-
tives prices exposed logical gaps. But it also suggested a coherent story about why ratings bias
might have emerged and why investors could not use past data to detect it. Developing a model
of the market for ratings where asset issuers can shop for ratings revealed circumstances where
an increase in asset complexity could generate ratings bias. Solving the model also delivered ad-
ditional insights. It revealed a feedback e®ect whereby an increase in asset complexity prompted
ratings shopping, which gave issuers and incentive to structure even more complex assets. It
also illustrated how more competition in ratings markets could make the distortions in ratings
even more severe. An extension of the model where investors purchase ratings uncovered multi-
ple equilibria. This taught us that a move to investor-initiated ratings is risky because markets
for ratings may collapse, leaving investors with even less reliable information than before.
None of the policy options we examined were without their drawbacks. Yet, the model points
to two possible solutions to the ratings bias problem. Investor-initiated ratings are a cure for
bias. The problem of market collapse is mitigated when the investors are large players in their
markets who ¯nd it valuable to purchase information, even if other investors do not. Since most
complex credit products are purchased by institutional investors, rather than households, the
large investor assumption might not be a bad one. The second possible solution is to have one
ratings agency, a regulated monopoly, that rates every bond. If every asset has one and only
one rating, shopping is not possible. Of course, regulated monopolies have less incentive to
26provide reliable information. However, the incentives for accuracy in the current near-duopoly
market are already quite weak. Ultimately, the choice between these two options is a quantity
versus quality choice. An investor-initiated system will produce less information, but will be
more reliable.
Many markets supply information or certi¯cation services: academic testing services, ap-
praisals or job head-hunters are just a few examples. (See also Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cunat
(2008).) Our paper raises the question: What determines the quality of the information pro-
duced? It points out that not only does the nature of the good being sold a®ect the information
available about it, but also that the nature of the evaluated products may change to game the
ratings system, possibly to a disastrous e®ect.
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29A Technical Appendix: Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Computation Details for the Disclosure Decision 2 versus 0
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¹ µ + µ is 2a: We now show that ¦D=2(¹ µ;µ) ¡ ¦D=0 > 0 cannot be satis¯ed even when ¹ µ + µ is 2a:
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The linear price result is analogous to that in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We guess that prices take the linear
form p = A + Bµ + Cx, determine what this price implies for risky asset demands, substitute those demand
functions into the market clearing conditions and match coe±cients to verify the hypothesis. Substituting asset
demands (24) and (28) in to the market clearing condition (25), yields
¸¾
¡2
² (µ ¡ pr) + (1 ¡ ¸)




= ½(¹ x + x)
Substituting in for ¾
2
µjp from (26) and ^ ¹ from (27) and collecting price terms reveals that the equilibrium price
formula is linear in x and µ:
A = ¡Ã
"



















C = ¡Ã½ (32)
where Ã = [¸¾
2











A.3 Proof of Lemma 3




30Expected Utility for Uninformed Investor First, take the ¯rst expectation, over u. Using the formula for
the mean of a log-normal, we get
E[u
Ujpr] = ¡exp[





























There is a second expectation over pr that we haven't taken. It turns out we won't need to. So, we leave
this line of argument here for now.





where µ replaced ^ ¹ as the conditional mean and ¾
2
e is now the conditional variance. Next step: take expectation
over µ, but not pr.
Now, this is a moment-generating-function of a quadratic normal (called a Wishart). General formula for
multi-variate quadratic forms: If z » N(0;§),
E[e







We need this more general form because µ ¡ pr is not mean-zero, conditional on pr. It has mean ^ ¹ ¡ pr.
½W
I = ½q
i(u ¡ pr) = (µ ¡ pr)
0¾
¡2
e (u ¡ pr)
The µ ¡ pr in the informed investor's expected utility, is a r.v, conditional on pr. It's mean is ^ ¹ ¡ pr and its
variance is var[µjpr] = ¾
2
µjp.


































(^ ¹ ¡ pr)
2¾
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Note that if we multiply numerator and denominator by ¾
2








































































































































The ratio of variances is a known quantity when information is acquired. All agents can infer the equilibrium
strategies of other agents and deduce how much information will be revealed through the price level. Since the
two expected utilities are related by a known constant, their unconditional expectations E[U
I] and E[U
U] must
be proportional as well.
31A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Let dit = 1 if agent i decides to discover information in period t and dit = 0 otherwise. Let per capita demand
for information with price Âit, given all other posted prices Â¡it, be I(¢;¢). Then the objective of the information
producer is to maximize pro¯t:
max
dit;Âit
dit(ÂitI(Âit;Â¡it) ¡ c): (33)
Suppose the equilibrium information price was above average cost Â > c=¸. Then, an alternate supplier
could enter the market with a slightly lower price, and make a pro¯t. If a supplier set price below marginal cost,
they would make a loss. This strategy would be dominated by no information provision. If there are two or more
suppliers, then either price is above marginal cost, which can't be an equilibrium by the ¯rst argument, or both
¯rms price at (or below) marginal cost, split the market, and make a loss, which is dominated by exit.
B Ratings Agencies' Incentive to Bias Ratings
Here we sketch a model where ratings agencies can choose to bias ratings if they ¯nd it pro¯table to do so. The
agency's utility depends on its pro¯ts and a reputation cost that is a quadratic function of the distance between
their forecast and the true asset payo®.
Suppose that once a rating is ordered, it is paid for. Then the rating agencies payo® is given by:
U
r = Â + ~ Â ¡ c ¡ ®(µi ¡ u)
2;
where c stands for the cost of producing a rating. Suppose that the investor of a rating can observe the rating
before purchasing it. Then, in this case the pro¯t of the rating agency depends on the probability that the asset
issuer purchases their rating ¼(µi) and the ratings price Â
U
r = ¼(~ µi)(Â + ~ Â) ¡ ®(~ µi ¡ u)
2 ¡ c: (34)
When the investor of a rating (so far we have looked at issuers buying ratings) buys the highest of all ratings,
than
¼i(~ µi) = prob(~ µi = max
j2I
~ µj):
There are two equivalent ways to model \ratings in°ation:" One way is to assume that rating agencies draw a
rating µi from an unbiased distribution, but they report a di®erent rating ~ µi = r(µi): The other is to model rating
agencies who draw from biased distributions. We sketch the ¯rst approach.
Assuming that all rating agencies use the same technology to produce ratings (draw ratings from the same









¡1(~ µi))(Â + ~ Â) ¡ ®(~ µi ¡ u)
2 ¡ c:
Heuristic derivation of the equilibrium reporting strategy:
First let G denote the distribution of the highest order statistic, namely G = F
I¡1: We also use g to denote
its density. Then U
r can be rewritten as:
U
r = G(r
¡1(~ µi))(Â + ~ Â) ¡ ®(~ µi ¡ u)
2 ¡ c:
Maximizing this expression with respect to ~ µi we get the following ¯rst order condition:
g(r
¡1(~ µi))(Â + ~ Â)
r0(r¡1(~ µi))
¡ 2®(~ µi ¡ u) = 0
Now recalling that ~ µi = r(µi) the above ¯rst order condition can be rewritten as:
g(µi)(Â + ~ Â)
r0(µi)
¡ 2®(r(µi) ¡ u) = 0
which in turn can be rewritten as:
g(µi)(Â + ~ Â) = r
0(µi) ¢ 2®(r(µi) ¡ u):
32This is a ¯rst order di®erential equation. To make things more transparent for its solution, let t = µi and r = y;
then it can be rewritten as
g(t)(Â + ~ Â) = y









g(t)(Â + ~ Â)
2®(y(t) ¡ u)
dy(t) ¢ 2®(y(t) ¡ u) = g(t)(Â + ~ Â) ¢ dt
integrating the left side with respect to y and the right side with respect to t we get that:
Z
y
2®(y(t) ¡ u)dy(t) =
Z
t
g(t)(Â + ~ Â) ¢ dt + c
where c is a constant. The solution to this di®erential equation characterizes the optimal bias of the ratings
agencies.
33